The strong sequential core for two-stage economies with a possibly incomplete set of assets in period zero and trade in commodities in period one consists of those goods allocations that are in the classical core and moreover, after realization of the state of nature, in the core of the economy where executed asset contracts serve as initial endowments. The strong sequential core coincides with the classical core when all possible state-contingent c o n tracts may serve a s a n a s s e t . For nance economies it is shown that the strong sequential core is generically empty when there is an incomplete set of assets. Outside the setting of nance economies, we show that the strong sequential core can be empty e v en if there is a complete set of assets. If the set of constrained feasible allocations resulting from trading in assets, is enlarged to include also allocations outside the agents' consumption sets, then a complete set of assets is su cient for the equivalence of the resulting semi-strong sequential core and the classical core.
Introduction
The usual implicit assumption for a cooperative solution concept like the core is that the agents can write binding contracts on outcomes provided by that concept. In a static situation like a one-shot cooperative game or an exchange economy it is not essential whether a core allocation is regarded as a candidate for a binding contract or whether it is directly interpreted as one. Agreeing on such an allocation is equivalent to carrying it out since nothing happens in between. This is radically di erent in a dynamic situation, even in the case of complete certainty. Agents or coalitions might change their minds after an originally agreed upon contract has partially been carried out, because it might no longer be in their best interest to stick t o i t . In the case of uncertainty, where information becomes available over time, this is even more likely to occur.
In this paper we consider the case of a two-period exchange economy under uncertainty. In period zero there is trade in assets, of which the payo s depend on the future, unknown, state of the world. In period one the uncertainty is resolved, asset contracts are executed and on this basis trade in commodities takes place. In the ex ante or classical core as in Aumann (1961) , coalitions consider the allocations that they can achieve i n e a c h s t a t e of nature by pooling their endowments, and compute their ex ante utilities over these allocations. A classical core allocation consists of a bundle of goods for each agent in each state of nature such that no coalition can improve ex ante. In this notion asset trading does not play a role since in any state of nature any redistribution of the initial endowments is agreed upon ex ante and is compatible with any t r a d e i n a s s e t s in period zero.
The classical core concept, however, fails to take i n to account that agents can reconsider their positions in the subeconomy at period one after resolution of the uncertainty. Then asset trading becomes important since it determines the initial positions in each state of nature. Coalitions might b e able to improve upon the initial classical core allocation ex post. A classical core allocation might not be self-enforcing once the state of nature in period one is known. Similar point of views have been taken in Gale (1978) , Repullo (1988) , and Koutsougeras (1998) , who discuss sequential core concepts, and Kranich et al. (2000) , who study multi-period models where at each period the agents face a cooperative game, but there is no uncertainty.
To capture the implications of self-enforcement, we impose on top of the conditions of the classical core, the requirement that in each state of nature the resulting allocation is in the core of the subeconomy in which executed asset contracts serve as initial endowments. In this natural way the dynamic nature of the economy is taken into account and a re nement of the classical core is obtained. This re nement is called the strong sequential core, and it is the central topic of this paper.
When each possible contingent contract may serve as an asset, i.e. there is an asset for each commodity contingent o n e a c h state of nature, the strong sequential core coincides with the classical core. Indeed, it is possible to implement the classical core allocation directly by an appropriate trade in assets in period zero. Retrading in period one cannot lead to improvements by de nition of the classical core.
In general, standard assumptions cannot guarantee non-emptiness of the strong sequential core. For the special case of nance economies, i.e. one good is traded at each state of nature, the sharper result was obtained that the strong sequential core is empty for any choice of the initial endowments in the set of full measure, if the numberof the states of nature exceeds the numberof assets by at least two.
An obvious question is whether equivalence with the classical core is still obtained if there is only a complete set of assets in the sense of Arrow (1953) . The surprising answer is that not only equivalence may fail to hold, but even that the strong sequential core may be empty. We show that this is partially due to the requirement, implicit in the de nition of the strong sequential core, that the endowments in the subeconomies resulting from asset trading in period zero, must bein the consumption sets of the agents.
We also de ne the so-called semi-strong sequential core. In that de nition it is no longer required that the endowments at the beginning of period one belong to the consumption sets of the agents. We show that when there is a complete set of assets, then equivalence of the classical core and the semi-strong sequential core obtains.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 speci es the model and some preliminaries, and Section 3 de nes the strong sequential core. Section 4 considers the special case of nance economies and Section 5 treats the general multiple commodity case. Section 6 de nes the semi-strong sequential core and states our equivalence result. Section 7 concludes. The more involved proofs are collected in the Appendix.
The Model and Preliminaries

The Model
We consider an economy w i t h t wo time periods (t = 0 t = 1) and uncertainty concerning period one. Uncertainty is modelled as a nite set f1 : : : S g of states of nature with given probabilities s > 0 s = 1 : : : S of occurrence. Period t = 0 is identi ed with state s = 0 .
There is a set N = f1 : : : n g of agents. Agents trade in J assets in period 0 and, conditional on the realization of the state of nature s in L commodities in period 1. In state of nature s = 1 : : : S agent i has a consumption set X The matrix of asset payo s is given by t h e S L J matrix A: The generic entry A j s l of the matrix A speci es the quantity of commodity l paid by asset j in state of nature s.
These components together de ne our economy, denoted by E. We shall often parametrize economies by the agents' endowments !. A t ypical element of this family is denoted by E ! .
The institutional set-up of the economy is as follows. 1. In period 0, trade in assets takes place. Alternatively, one may think of these trades taking the form of state-contingent contracts. There are no endowments and therefore no consumption in period t = 0 . o (6) are the classical cores of the subeconomies at states s = 0 1 : : : S . These expressions will be helpful in expressing the strong (and the semi-strong) sequential core for the economy E ! :
3 The Strong Sequential Core
We start with an example that suggests the role one may assign to assets in a dynamic economy.
Example
Consider the economy of Section 2.3 with two commodities and two states of nature. The two agents have i d e n tical consumption sets and utility functions de ned in ( where the rst two columns correspond to s = 1 and the last two to s = 2.
Consider the allocation y given by y 1 y 2 = 1=2 1=2 1=2 1=2 1=2 1=2 1=2 1=2 : In period t = 0 there are no pro table deviations from y: It cannot be improved upon by the grand coalition and gives both agents higher expected utility t h a n their initial endowments. Hence, y may well beagreed upon at the outset.
Assume for a moment that there are no assets traded in period t = 0. Then agents begin the exchange game in period t = 1 having their initial endowments !. Suppose that the state of the world s = 1 has realized. To achieve allocation y 1 , agreed upon earlier in the game, agent 1 m ust give agent 2 positive amounts of both commodities. However, once the state of nature is known, this exchange is no longer individually rational. The de nition of the strong sequential core takes these considerations into account, and rules out such allocations. Now suppose that there is an asset, of which t h e p a yo s are given by the vector Suppose, as before, that state s = 1 has realized. In the trade that follows execution of contracts it would then be individually rational for both agents to exchange x 1 for y 1 . The same is true for the second state of nature. In this way trade in assets in period t = 0 m a y prevent agents from deviating in subsequent periods. Indeed, the allocation y will turn out to bean element of the strong sequential core in this example.
De nition of the Strong Sequential Core
De nition 1 An allocation y 2 X is an element of the strong sequential core of the economy E, denoted by S S C(E), if 1. y 2 C(E 0 ) 2. there exists x 2 A such that y s 2 C(E s x ) for all s = 1 : : : S :
Point 1 of the de nition requires that there are no deviations from y in period t = 0. Point 2 guarantees that there are no deviations in the subsequent period, given the appropriate asset trades arranged at the outset. In the absence of asset markets the possibilities for the grand coalition are fairly limited. Its choice of allocations is restricted to the cores of the rst-period economies that originate from the initial endowments, C(E s ! ).
However, when there are assets in the economy, the grand coalition can support di erent allocations by redistributing assets among its membersin period zero. We may think of the grand coalition as redistributing assets in period t = 0 of the economy in order to prevent subcoalitions from deviating in the subsequent period.
Note that the strong sequential core increases when the set of constrained feasible allocations increases. If, in particular, A has rank S L then every classical core allocation can besustained as an allocation in the strong sequential core. Indeed, any classical core allocation can beachieved directly by an appropriate trade in assets. At the arrival of period 1, contracts are executed, and no retrading of commodities is needed. Summarizing:
Theorem 1 If the set of assets traded in an economy expands, the strong sequential core weakly increases. If A has rank S L then S S C(E) = C(E 0 ). An important case where the rank of A is S Lis the one where for each commodity contingent o n e a c h state, there is a contract specifying its delivery in period 1. This corresponds to the complete market structure as analyzed in traditional general equilibrium theory. Nevertheless, the requirement t h a t the rank of A equals S Lis very demanding. The next two sections consider the more interesting case where some assets are missing.
Finance Economies
We start out with the special case of nance economies. In a nance economy there is just one commodity i n e a c h state of nature (L = 1). We assume that The statement 2 of the theorem 2 cannot be strengthened in either direction.
More precisely, when J = S ; 1, then there may exist two complementary subsets and of , both with non-empty interiors, such that for all economies in the set the strong sequential core is non-empty, and for all those in the set the strong sequential core is empty. This is demonstrated by the following example.
Example 1 Consider the following family of nance economies E ! parameterized by the agents' endowments ! 2 = R nS ++ . We assume that S 3, n = 2 and the agents have identical consumption sets and utility functions The strong sequential core of the economy E ! is therefore either an empty set or a single-element set de ned by (7) . It is a single-element set if the allocation de ned by (7) 
The Multiple Commodities Case
Let the number of commodities be arbitrary, L 1. The rst observation is that Theorem 1 cannot be extended to economies with multiple goods. When L > 1, then, irrespective of the number of assets, there exist robust examples of economies with a non-empty strong sequential core. That is, there is a subset with non-empty interior, such that for all economies in the strong sequential core is non-empty. Such an example is the following one.
Example 2 (Robust existence of the strong sequential core) We consider the family of economies E ! parameterized by the agents' endowments ! 2 = R nSL ++ . We assume that L 2, n = 2 and that the agents have identical consumption sets and utility functions de ned by (1){(3). Assume that there are no assets.
The cores for the economies E 0 ! and E s ! are given by (5) hold true. Therefore, this allocation is an interior point of the set .
We conclude that for all economies in the set the strong sequential core is non-empty. Due to Theorem 1, we can augment the economy by any number of assets while preserving the robust non-emptiness of the strong sequential core. It has already been noted (Theorem 1) that the strong sequential core weakly increases in the rank of matrix A and that it coincides with C(E 0 ) when the rank of A reaches S L . In the remainder of this section we explore the case of a strongly complete set of assets, by which we mean the following. In particular, this`box-product condition' implies that the rank of matrix A is not less than S. Under this assumption of strong completeness, nancial markets equilibria exist, coincide with equilibria in the complete markets model, and are therefore Pareto-e cient, see Arrow (1953) .
There are at least two reasons why one might conjecture that under strong completeness the strong sequential core is non-empty, and in fact equal to the classical core. The rst intuition is based on the case of nance economies, where strong completeness is equivalent t o t h e requirement that the rank of A beS: We have already shown that in the setting of nance economies the strong sequential core is equal to classical core when this rank condition holds. The second intuition comes indeed from the above mentioned equivalence between the complete markets model and an economy as described in Arrow (1953) with a sequential structure, but a complete set of Arrow securities. Note also that Theorem 1 states equivalence to the classical core when the rank of A equals LS:
It turns out, however, that such a conjecture is false. Not only is there no equivalence to the classical core. The strong sequential core might even be empty when L 2 and the set of assets is strongly complete. A reason for the emptiness of the strong sequential core is found in the de nition of A, the set of constrained feasible allocations. The requirement that a constrained feasible allocation x should lie in a consumption set may cause the strong sequential core to be empty, even when there is a strongly complete set of assets. This is illustrated in the following example, and elaborated in the next section, where we consider the semi-strong sequential core. De nition 4 An allocation y 2 X is an element of the semi-strong sequential core, denoted by S S C 0 (E), if 1. y 2 C(E 0 ), 2. there exists an x 2 A 0 such that y s 2 C(E s x ) s = 1 : : : S :
The semi-strong sequential core allows for the interpretation that agents may have debts at the beginning of period 1, that is an allocation outside the consumption set. By the end of period 1 all debts must be paid back, so that the nal allocation y belongs to the consumption set.
De nition 4 involves an extension of the classical core to those economies E s x whose initial endowments x do not belong to the consumption sets. To In particular, the conditions of individual rationality are valid only for those agents whose initial endowments belongto the consumption sets. It should be stressed that the extension of the classical core to a wider class of economies does not involve the extension of the utility functions beyond the consumption sets.
The main result of this section is the following theorem, which states the equivalence of the classical core and the semi-strong sequential core when there is a strongly complete set of assets. Its proof is in Appendix A.2. 
Concluding Remarks
The fact that most economic interaction takes place over time has received very limited attention in the part of the economic literature that focuses on cooperative solution concepts. In this paper we have studied the implications arising from the unravelling of time and uncertainty for the concept of the core. The strong sequential core imposes an additional requirement of time consistency on the classical core, in the sense that a strong sequential core allocation can be achieved without any coalition having an incentive t o deviate at any point in time.
The strong sequential core highlights a stabilizing property of assets. It is weakly increasing in the numberof assets traded, and is shown to beequivalent to the classical core, when all the possible contingent contracts are present in the economy. Surprisingly, equivalence and even non-emptiness of the strong sequential core may fail under quite stringent notions of completeness of the set of assets being traded.
The possible emptiness of the strong sequential core suggests that some weakenings of it be considered. One is to allow for debts at the beginning of period one, leading to the semi-strong sequential core, which is also studied in this paper. The semi-strong sequential core coincides with the classical core when the set of assets traded is strongly complete, but might still be empty otherwise. Another weakening of the strong sequential core can be obtained by requiring the blocking allocations of coalitions to be credible in the sense that they should belongto the cores of the ex posteconomies restricted to that coalition. The concept of the weak sequential core that arises from such a requirement is studied in Predtechenski et al. (2001) . In that paper it is shown that the weak sequential core, although is a superset of the strong sequential core, might still beempty when the set of assets is not su ciently complete. Blending time and uncertainty therefore points at serious problems of the core concepts, in particular when it is only possible to trade in a limited set of contracts at the outset. The observation that any compact and discrete set is nite completes the proof.
Step 1. Suppose that there is an allocation y which is Pareto-e cient in the economy E 0 and not Pareto-e cient in the economy E ! in some state 2 f 1 : : : S g. Then there exists an allocationỹ 2 X , such that Step 2. Take an allocation y such that y s 2 P(E s ! ) \ int(X s ) for all s 2 f1 : : : S g. Under the assumptions of the theorem, the Second Welfare theorem implies that there exist vectors of commodity prices p s 2 R y is Pareto-optimal in the economy E 0 . Steps 1 and 2 then imply that y is an element of the semi-strong sequential core. This completes the proof since it follows readily from the de nition of the strong sequential core that S S C(E) C(E 0 ):
